A case study of a combat aircraft's single hit vulnerability. by Novak, Robert Edwin, Jr.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1986
A case study of a combat aircraft's single hit vulnerability.











A CASE STUDY OF A COMBAT AIRCRAFT'S
SINGLE HIT VULNERABILITY
by
Robert Edwin Novak, Jr.
September 1986
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Robert E. Ball











DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
ADDRESS (Cry, State, and ZIP Code)
Dnterey, California 93943-5000






9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









TITLE (include Security Clarification)
CASE STUDY OF AN AIRCRAFT'S SINGLE HIT VULNERABILITY
PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
ovak, Robert Edwin, Jr.
3 TYPE OF REPORT
aster ' s Thesis
13b TIME COVERED
FROM TO











reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
al design, combat survivability,
ility assessment, single hit
ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
his thesis presents the methodology for a d
ent of a generic aircraft in the conceptual
he single hit vulnerability of the aircraft
ermined using the textbook, The Fundamental
ty Analysis and Design . The intent of this





to a 100 grain fragment is de-
s of Aircraft Combat Survivabil -
work is to provide a realistic
t can be used by others as a
D S*»'3UTiON/AVAlLABlLlTY OF ABSTRACT
S .NClASSiF!EDAJNLIMITED SAME AS RPT D DTIC USERS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
(unclassified)
a *,AME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
rofessor Robert E. Ball




)FORM 1473. 34 mar 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions ate obsolete
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
(UNCLASSIFIED)
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
A Case Study of a Combat Aircraft's
Single Hit Vulnerability
by
Robert Edwin ^Novak, Jr.
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1978
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





This thesis presents the methodology for a detailed
vulnerability assessment of a generic aircraft in the con-
ceptual/preliminary design stage. The single hit vulner-
ability of the aircraft to a 100 grain fragment is
determined using the textbook, The Fundamentals of Aircraft
Combat Survivability Analysis and Design . The intent of
this work is to provide a realistic case study of a






II. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OVERVIEW 13
III. SURVIVABILITY PROGRAM OVERVIEW 2
A. MISSION THREAT ANALYSIS 22
B. AIRCRAFT GEOMETRIC DESCRIPTION 23
C. FLIGHT AND MISSION ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS 24
D. FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY
ANALYSIS 2 5
E. AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 40
F. AIRCRAFT SUSCEPTIBILITY ASSESSMENT 41
G. AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT 43
H. COMBAT DAMAGE REPAIR ASSESSMENT 44
IV. THE AIRCRAFT ' 46
A. REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL 46
B. DESIGN SUMMARY 47
V. A-20 MISSION THREAT ANALYSIS 53
A. MISSION ANALYSIS 53
B. THREAT ANALYSIS 59
VI. A-20 FLIGHT AND MISSION ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS 62
VII. A-2 FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRTICALITY
ANALYSIS 70
A. A-2 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 7
B. A-20 DAMAGE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 88
VIII. A-20 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 159
A. VULNERABILITY CALCULATIONS 162
B. VULNERABILITY REDUCTION FEATURES 186
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 19
LIST OF REFERENCES 191
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 192
LIST OF TABLES
3.1 SYSTEM DAMAGE CAUSED-KILL MODES 31
6.1 A-20 SYSTEMS/SUBSYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONS 65
6.2 A-20 FLIGHT AND MISSION ESSENTIAL FUNCTION
SUMMARY 67
7.1 A-2 FUEL SYSTEM FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS
ANALYSIS 89
7.2 A-2 FUEL SYSTEM DAMAGE MODES AND EFFECTS
ANALYSIS 9 8
7.3 A-2 FUEL SYSTEM DAMAGE MODES AND EFFECTS
ANALYSIS NOTES 101
7.4 A-20 FAULT TREE COMPONENT LIST 112
7.5 A-20 CRITICAL COMPONENT LIST 154
8.1 CRITICAL COMPONENTS INTERSECTED BY SHOTLINES 170
.8.2 SHOTLINE 1—NONREDUNDANT COMPONENTS WITH OVER-
LAP 174
8.3 SHOTLINE 2—REDUNDANT COMPONENTS WITH NO OVER-
LAP 177
8.4 SHOTLINE 3—REDUNDANT COMPONENTS WITH OVER-
LAP 18 3
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Major Systems Acquisition Milestones 14
2.2 Acquisition Cycle Interrelationships 15
2.3 Generic Design Process 18
3.1 Survivability Life Cycle 21
3.2 Interfaces of the FMECA Process 27
3.3 Example FMEA Format 29
3.4 Example DMEA Matrix 33
3.5 Example Disablement Diagram 34
3.6 Example Kill Tree Diagram 36
3.7 Example P(k/h) Function 38
3.8 Generic Fault Tree Diagram 39
4.1 A-20 ELIMINATOR— 48
4.2 A-20 ELIMINATOR (four view) 49
5.1 Generic Hi-Low/Low-Hi Mission Profile 54
5.2 Generic Hi-Hi/Hi-Hi Mission Profile 55
5.3 A-20 Typical Hi-Low/Low-Hi Mission 57
5.4 A-20 Typical Hi-Hi/Hi-Hi Mission 58
5.5 A-20 Conceptual Tactics 60
7.1 A-20 Fuel System 73
7.2 A-20 Hydraulics System 75
7.3 A-20 Flight Controls System 77
7.4 A-20 Propulsion System 79
7.5 A-20 Armament System 83
7.6 A-20 Structural System 85
7.7 A-20 Fuel System Disablement Diagram 103
7.8 A-20 Fault Tree Diagram 108
7.9 A-20 Kill Tree Diagram 146
8.1 The Aircraft Assessment Aspects 160
8.2 A-20 Assessment Aspect 161
8.3 A-20 Shotline Grid 163
8.4 Fuel System Shotline Intercepts 164
8.5 Hydraulic System Shotline Intercepts 165
8.6 Flight Controls System Shotline Intercepts 166
8.7 Propulsion System Shotline Intercepts 167
8.8 Armament System Shotline Intercepts 168
8.9 Structural System Shotline Intercepts 169
8.10 A-20 Design Improvements 189
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My sincerest thanks to Professor Robert E. Ball for
his tutelage and guidance in helping me to complete this
project. Your knowledge, encouragement and confidence in
me were an asset to an otherwise long and demanding cur-
riculum. I am also deeply indebted to Don Jacobs for
creating the artwork that gives this project life.
To my wife Mary, and children Patrick and Kathleen,
thank you for understanding the long hours and absences. I
can say for sure that without your love and support none of
this would have been possible.
I. INTRODUCTION
"The survivability of an aircraft operating in an enemy
threat environment depends on its design and on the
emphasis placed on its survivability throughout its life
cycle. The cost of modern aircraft weapons systems, the
aircraft and personnel attrition experienced in recent
combat, and the resulting loss of operational capability
make survivability enhancement imperative." This paragraph
is in the forward of MILITARY STANDARD 2 069/AS (MILSTD
2069) , Requirements for Aircraft Non-Nuclear Survivability
Programs [Ref. l:p. iii] . This document establishes the
guidelines between the contractor and the Department of
Defense (DoD) regarding survivability design in major
weapons systems. Its primary thrust is that survivability
must be a design requirement, one that is incorporated and
implemented from the conceptual design phase through the
total life cycle of a major weapons system.
The survivability design discipline has only recently
become a major factor in weapons acquisition. Dr. R.E.
Ball, Professor of Aeronautics at the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) in Monterey, California recognized the
importance of aircraft survivability in a hostile threat
environment more than ten years ago. What began as a set
of notes for a course taught at NPS has evolved into The
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Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and
Design [Ref. 2]; the first textbook that fully examines the
total survivability picture from both the design and
analysis points of view. Dr. Ball's book is the basis for
the following case study in the vulnerability of an
aircraft in the conceptual/preliminary design phase.
The author, following the words of Dr. Ball
[Ref. 2:p. 11], "survivability must seriously be consid-
ered by everyone during the early design phase of the
aircraft"; chose to do a vulnerability analysis of an
aircraft of his own design. This aircraft was designed to
fulfill the requirements of AE-4273, Aircraft Conceptual
Design, a graduate level aeronautics course taught at the
Naval Postgraduate School.
The course material is based on a seminar in conceptual
design given by Mr. D.P. Raymer of Rockwell International.
The course develops the aircraft design based on a given,
generic Request For Proposal (RFP) for an attack aircraft.
The aircraft was developed using historical data, "rules of
thumb", current aeronautics trends, and regression equa-
tions. The component layouts and structural arrangements
were conceived by the author using current tactical
aircraft designs as guidelines. The resulting conceptual
design was then analyzed with respect to aeronautical and
operational capabilities. Lift curves, drag polars,
weights, and other performance parameters were determined
11
to establish compliance with the requirements set forth by
the RFP.
The author's design represents a generic aircraft, one
in which the systems, structures, capabilities, and
performance are unclassified. By conducting a vulnerabil-
ity assessment of this generic, conceptual design, the
author hopes to obtain the widest dissemination of this
critical design consideration.
Prior to discussion of this topic, it should be stated
that this case study is based soley on the methodology
presented by Ball [Ref. 2]. The author assumes the reader
is very familiar with this methodology, or has the ref-
erence readily available. The specifics of Dr. Ball's book
will not be repeated here, the reader is left to refer to
the text as necessary for any background clarification. In
each succeeding chapter, references are made to pages,
figures, etc., to assist the reader. (Although the author
feels that this case study could stand alone to someone
intimately familiar with aircraft combat survivability, the
language and methods of this engineering discipline are
somewhat unique and further guidance and reference is
sometimes very helpful.)
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II. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OVERVIEW
The acquisition process for a major weapons system is a
lengthy and costly one. From initial analysis to full
scale production, the time period may span ten or more
years. It is imperative that everything possible is done
to ensure that the system is the most "effective" one that
industry and the government can produce.
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 (DoDINST
5000.2) [Ref. 3] is the primary guideline for the Major
System Acquisition Process. Figure 2.1 [Ref. 4:p. ICD-1]
shows the tasks and Milestones that must be met in order to
satisfy all of the DoD requirements for the production of a
major system. Figure 2.2 [Ref. 4:p. ICD-2] presents the
different acquisition cycle interrelationships that are
conducted simultaneously in order to meet the Milestones
required by DoDINST 5000.2 [Ref. 3]. The conceptual/pre-
liminary design phase activities are required to be com-
pleted between Milestones and 1.
By the time Milestone has been completed, the
following has been accomplished with regard to system
development:
1. A threat has been identified and a system to counter
the threat has been proposed. The Defense Intelli-
gence Agency has validated the threat and made the


































Figure 2.2 Acquisition Cycle Interrelationships
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The Department of Defense responds with a Request
For Information (RFI) to the defense industry. This
is a document soliciting concepts for the system the
DoD feels it needs to counter the expected threat.
The RFI will specify the boundary conditions to be
looked at in the early development of the system,
such as survivability, logistics, costs, standardi-
zation to existing systems, etc. . Industry in turn,
responds to the DOD's requirements with an estima-
tion of the technological feasibility of building
the system to fulfill its intended use. This system
is based on historical data, engineering trends, and
future hardware capability estimates.
DoD looks at industry's response, and if satisfied,
requests a Justification of Major Systems New Start,
or JMSNS. Here, approval from the Secretary of
Defense is required to continue research and develop-
ment into the new system. Once that approval is
received, Milestone has been met.
After Milestone has been met, DoD once again makes a
request to industry to submit ideas or proposals for the
new weapons system. The Request for Proposal (RFP) is used
by the industry to develop its conceptual systems design.
The time period between Milestone and Milestone 1 is
usually two to three years as shown in Figure 2.1. The RFP
is much more detailed and specific in its guidelines than
the RFI. It relays to industry specifically what the
weapons system must be capable of doing to eliminate the
expected threat. It provides guidelines with regards to
categories such as aerodynamics, performance, size, weight,
mission, weapons/armament, carrier suitability/field
performance, survivability and crew considerations.
Industry then uses this document as the baseline data for
its conceptual/ preliminary designs. The generic design
16
process is shown in Figure 2.3. This table breaks down the
design process into three phases of development. For the
purpose of this case study, the aircraft design is' assumed
to be between phases two and three of the design process.
The importance of a survivability assessment in the
conceptual/preliminary design phase cannot be over-
emphasized. As seen in Figure 2.3, each phase of the
design process requires a corresponding survivability
analysis. It is a requirement that is noted in every
guideline to contractors for major weapons systems. For
example, MILSTD 2069 [Ref. l:p. 1] states:
"A standard must be developed in the early stages of
major systems acquisition. A survivability assessment
program is to be included in each contractural work
statement. The purpose of this is to require studies,
threat definitions, and contractural trade-offs to allow
contractors to propose conceptual or notational designs
which will meet combat survivability demands and generate
data upon which firm design requirements will be based
for full scale engineering development."
From an economic standpoint alone, the government
should demand conceptual trade-off studies using surviv-
ability assessment methodology. It is much easier, and
much more cost effective, to change a design while in the
"paper phase", than to attempt to modify an existing air-
frame. The assessment in the conceptual/preliminary phase
provides an opportunity to examine the effects of changes
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Figure 2.3 Generic Design Process
18
affect the aircraft's survivability, performance, tactics,
maintainability, reliability, armament and cost can be
evaluated and assessed with regards to the benefits and
penalties. The following chapter will introduce the
survivability program and the steps necessary for its
implementation and completion.
19
III. SURVIVABILITY PROGRAM OVERVIEW
The contractor for a major weapons system must
establish a DoD approved Survivability Program and inte-
grate it into the company's management system. Ball [Ref.
2 :p. 34] , states:
"To develop a survivable, cost-effective aircraft
requires a systematic survivability program beginning in
the conceptual phase and continuing throughout the life
cycle of the aircraft. It is essential that surviva-
bility criteria be established early in the conceptual
phase and that alternative designs and utilization
solutions be developed. By developing this information
before the final design configuration is established,
the most cost effective survivability enhancement
techniques can be identified."
MILSTD 2069, Requirements for Aircraft Non-Nuclear
Survivability Programs [Ref. 1], is the standard the DoD
uses to provide uniform requirements and guidelines for
establishing survivability programs. Figure 3.1 [Ref. l:p.
2] shows the life cycle of a typical survivability program.
It shows that survivability is a continuous process that
begins in the initiation phase and continues throughout the
life cycle of a weapons system.
The survivability of an aircraft is related to two
fundamental attributes, susceptibility and vulnerability.
The susceptibility of an aircraft can be defined as the
inability of the aircraft to avoid being hit while
conducting its mission. It is dependent upon how well the
20
Figure 3.1 Survivability Life Cycle
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enemy is able to detect, identify, track, acquire, and hit
the aircraft as a target. The vulnerability of an aircraft
is the measure of how much the system or systems are
degraded due to the hit by the damage causing mechanisms.
A survivability program is concerned with all the design
factors that influence the aircraft's susceptibility and
vulnerability.
MILSTD 2069 [Ref. l:pp. 12-25] defines the following
tasks that must be included in a survivability program:
1. Mission Threat Analysis
2. Aircraft Geometric Configuration
3. Flight and Mission Essential Functions
Identification
4. Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
5. Aircraft Vulnerability Assessment
6. Aircraft Susceptibility Assessment
7. Aircraft Survivability Assessment
8. System/Cost Effective Analysis
9. Survivability Enhancement Trade-Off Studies
10. Combat Damage Repair Assessment
Most of these tasks will be explained in a general manner
according to MILSTD 2069 [Ref. 1] . Then, in subsequent
chapters, the first five tasks will be accomplished using
the generic aircraft.
A. MISSION THREAT ANALYSIS
The missions of the aircraft and the expected threat
systems are expressed in the DoD generated specifications
such as the RFI and RFP. The expected flight profiles and
defense situations that the DoD has identified are used to
develop designs and conduct trade-off studies.
22
The contractor attempts to define each operational mode
in terms of aircraft performance, weights, armament, etc.,
to meet the expected threat scenario that has been given as
the basis for the design. Encounter conditions should be
determined and used as the basis for survivability design
and trade-off studies. These studies are used to ensure
the aircraft can operate effectively in the threat environ-
ment. It is important to identify all possible threats the
aircraft may encounter during a mission. If the aircraft
is capable of a multifunction role, then the expected
threats will vary according to the situation and the envi-
ronment the aircraft is in.
According to Ball [Ref. 2:p. 115], the Mission Threat
Analysis can be divided into three phases:
(1) Define the mission and the flight envelopes of the
aircraft. This will encompass operating environ-
ments, mission types and flight conditions.
(2) Define the expected threat environment for each
mission and theater. Here the enemy systems are
analyzed to determine their envelopes.
(3) Combine the data gathered in the first two phases.
Estimate the likelihood of encounter between the
aircraft and each threat system, and identify the
conditions of each at the time of encounter.
B. AIRCRAFT GEOMETRIC DESCRIPTION
The aircraft geometric description is the development
of a detailed, accurate description of the aircraft for use
in the vulnerability analysis. For an aircraft in the
23
conceptual/preliminary design phase, as much technical and
functional data as possible must be collected on each major
system of the aircraft. This data should include, but need
not be limited to:
1. engineering drawings
2. trade-off study results
3. 3-view scale drawings
4. narrative descriptions of the proposed systems
5. block diagrams
6. flow charts
7. projected performance data
8. cross section drawings
For an aircraft currently in the inventory, its NATOPS and
MIMS could be added to this list to provide a thorough des-
cription of the aircraft, its systems and operating capa-
bilities.
For aircraft being analyzed using current computer
programs for single hit vulnerability (see Ball [Ref. 2:p.
192-198]), this collected data is used to generate a geo-
metric model and descriptor of the aircraft and its
systems. This model is then used with the computer pro-
grams to develop vulnerability indices for the aircraft.
Such a task is beyond the scope of this case study.
C. FLIGHT AND MISSION ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
Using the missions defined by the DOD, the contractor
must determine the flight and mission essential functions
for each mission phase. A flight essential function is
that function performed by one or more components on the
24
aircraft which permits the aircraft to sustain flight
through adequate lift, thrust and control.
A mission essential function is a function performed by
one or more components on the aircraft that permits it to
accomplish its defined mission. For example, the weapons
delivery system of an attack aircraft is not a mission es-
sential function during the take-off, climb-out or cruise
phases of a flight. But it is definitely a mission essen-
tial function during an ordnance delivery run on a desig-
nated target.
D. FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS (FMECA)
The Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) is a multidiscipline design procedure, utilizing
design inputs such as system reliability, maintainability,
and safety to define the response of the aircraft and its
systems to damage caused by the damage mechanisms. As
such, it is one of the most important parts of the vul-
nerability assessment. The ultimate goal of this analysis
is to identify the aircraft's critical components. A
critical component is defined as one whose damage or loss
could lead to an attrition level or mission abort level
kill.
Utilized in the conceptual design phase, MILSTD 2069
[Ref. l:p. 13], defines the FMECA as a procedure that:
25
(1) Documents all possible potential failures for each
component or subsystem.
(2) Determines by prediction and analysis the effect of
each of the failures on system operation.
(3) Identifies potential failures critical to personnel
safety.
(4) Ranks each failure according to effect severity.
The FMECA procedure is performed in two steps, (1) a Fail-
ure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and (2) a Damage Mode
and Effects Analysis (DMEA) . Another analysis tool, not
formally required by MILSTD 2 069 is the Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) . This can be used in addition to, or in place of, an
FMEA if one is not available.
1. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Figure 3.2 [Ref. l:p. 15] shows the role of the
FMECA in the overall vulnerability assessment. In the FMEA
phase:
(1) The contractor must identify, to the best of his
theoretical and analytical ability, all possible
failures and their effects on the aircraft.
(2) Each critical component is identified and its
functions defined.
(3) All possible failures of the component are examin-
ed, including those due to its location within the
aircraft.
(4) The results of these failures must be related to
the components own functional ability and also to
the functional abilities of the system from which
that component is a part. This in turn, is related











Figure 3.2 Interfaces of the FMECA Process
27
The major input to the FMEA is the physical and
functional description of the aircraft and its systems,
components, etc. . This information is the Aircraft
Geometric Description as discussed earlier. The output of
the FMEA is usually in the format of a self-explanatory
table or matrix (Figure 3.3) [Ref. 2:p. 142]. The
contractor must be as specific as possible to the current
level of design. For the conceptual/preliminary level,
major systems and some basic components can be broken down
into sufficient detail to provide a thorough analysis. In
later stages, the actual "nuts and bolts" of the components
are examined for possible failure modes.
2 . Damage Mode and Effects Analysis (DMEA)
The second part of the FMECA, the DMEA, is related
to and dependent upon predicted damage from exposure to the
combat environment. The contractor must assess the com-
ponent's potential failures due to the damage mechanisms,
relate these failures to the kill level required in the
assessment, and quantify the component's ability to
continue to operate in the hostile environment.
The kill level referred to in the previous
paragraph can be any one of three categories of aircraft
kill that measure the degree to which the aircraft suffers
performance degradation. These categories are attrition
kill, mission abort kill and forced landing kill. The
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Figure 3 . 3 Example FMEA Format
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is a measure of the severity of aircraft damage that causes
it to be lost from the inventory. Time is the most
important parameter in the attrition kill, therefore it is
the basis for the four levels of attrition kill. These
levels are:
1. KK kill: Damage that will cause an aircraft to dis-
integrate immediately upon being hit.
2. K kill: Damage that causes an aircraft to fall out
of manned control within 30 seconds after being hit.
3. A kill: Damage that causes an aircraft to fall out
of manned control within 5 minutes after being hit.
4. B kill: Damage that causes an aircraft to fall out
of manned control 30 minutes after being hit.
The A level or 5 minute attrition kill is the kill level
usually used by DoD and industry to evaluate the vulner-
ability of an aircraft. The A level attrition will also be
used for this case study.
The DMEA relies heavily on information gained from
a correct and thorough FMEA. The DMEA also identifies any
secondary damage caused by the primary damage mechanism.
For example, a secondary fire caused by the detonation of
an HEIT projectile inside the aircraft's structure. Ball
[Ref. 2:p. 145] provides a table (Table 3.1) of the most
important damage caused failure or kill modes of the major
systems. Each system mentioned is broken down in the DMEA
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Because the DMEA analyzes the criticality of fail-
ure, the output from the study is more detailed and elab-
orate than from an FMEA. The DoD will notify the
contractor on the required DMEA data necessary for the
particular weapons system being assessed. The depth of
detail and breakdown will depend on which design phase the
assessment takes place in.
There are four sets of data which make up the DMEA
output. The first set is the DMEA Matrix or Table (Figure
3.4) [Ref. l:p. 17]. The contractor must break down the
aircraft systems to their component level; and relate these
components and their failure modes to the probability of
kill given a hit P(k/h) functions, kill level, and redun-
dancy levels. In a conceptual/preliminary design phase,
the contractor uses historical data and predicted engineer-
ing specifications of materials and components to make this
analysis
.
The second type of data produced from an DMEA is a
Disablement Diagram. Figure 3.5 [Ref. 2:p. 144] is the
graphical representation of the results of the FMEA and
DMEA. The contractor uses the system design proposals and
predicted survivability of each component to graphically
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Figure 3.5 Example Disablement Diagram
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The third set of data generated by a DMEA is the
Kill Tree or Kill Diagram. The Kill Diagrams are dev-
eloped by combining data from the Flight and Mission
Essential Functions Analysis, FMEA, DMEA, Disablement
Diagrams, and should include evaluation by members of the
operational community and engineers responsible for the
design of the aircraft. They are a function of kill level
and graphically depict the combination of components and
systems that must be sufficiently degraded to effect the
particular kill level on the aircraft.
The kill diagram is a visual illustration and iden-
tification of the critical components of the aircraft and
their redundancy relationships. It is constructed by the
contractor for the aircraft in a specific flight condition.
The example kill diagram shown in Figure 3.6 [Ref. 2:p.
153] illustrates the effect of redundancy on a system.
The last data source of the DMEA is the set of
"probability of kill, given a hit" functions (P(k/h)
.
These functions, or values are assigned to a component
based on its response to being impacted by a damage
mechanism (fragment or projectile) . The contractor
normally uses government provided or specified P(k/h)
values where required. In a conceptual/preliminary design
phase the contractor also uses historical data and
available ballistic test data to ascertain the amount of
damage the component will sustain. The P(k/h)
35
Figure 3.6 Example Kill Diagram
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for each component requires sound engineering judgement and
realistic design assessments. The functions can be expres-
sed graphically as a function of damage mechanism mass and
velocity (Figure 3.7) [Ref. 2:p. 156], or in analytical
format. The contractor uses the P(k/h) functions for
components that can be killed by a single shot and for
larger systems such as engines which are divided into
segments with specific P(k/h) values for each segment.
3. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
As previously mentioned, the Fault Tree Analysis is
not required by MILSTD 2069 as a task in a survivability
assessment. It is another method used to identify critical
components. It usually conducted when there has been no
FTA provided for the system under analysis. It can
actually replace the FMEA and is done in parallel to the
DMEA.
Ball [Ref. 2:p. 149] calls this analysis the "top
down" approach. An undesirable event is the catalyst for
the Fault Tree Analysis, then the events or combination of
events that caused the undesirable event are determined.
The undesirable event for this case study is the A-level
attrition kill. The contractor will analyze what could
cause this event to occur; breaking down systems into their
components and examining them for levels of redundancy, if






Figure 3.7 Example P(k/h) Function
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Figure 3.8 Generic Fault Tree Diagram
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symbology helps to branch the fault tree by recognizing
component redundancy and the relationship between cause and
effect.
E. AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
From a contractor's viewpoint, MILSTD 2069 [Ref. 1] is
very specific in its requirements concerning a vulner-
ability assessment. The data and information discussed in
the previous paragraphs is the backbone of any vulnerabil-
ity assessment. In the conceptual/preliminary design
phase, the contractor has the freedom to use either his own
or government approved methodology. Regardless of the
methodology, it must meet the following objectives as set
forth by MILSTD 2069 [Ref. l:p. 21].
(1) Identify deficiencies and evaluate methods and
design changes to reduce vulnerability.
(2) Provide quantified measures of vulnerability for
specific threats and kill levels for use in design
analyses and trade-off studies.
(3) Provide inputs for the survivability assessment of
the aircraft.
Vulnerability assessments can take various forms. The
contractor may use detailed computer analyses with geo-
metric models and various computer programs such as those
mentioned by Ball [Ref. 2:pp. 192-198]. Because this
aircraft is in the conceptual design phase, this method
will not be used for this case study.
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The contractor must also do a detailed analysis for the
aircraft's single hit vulnerable area using the P(k/h)
functions for the components. According to Ball [Ref. 2:p.
154], the vulnerable area is "a theoretical non-unique area
presented to the threat, that if hit by a damage mechanism,
would result in an aircraft kill.
The contractor may be required to develop a vulner-
ability analysis based on the P(k/d), the "probability of
kill given a detonation envelope" if the weapons system is
expected to encounter HE warheads in its mission profile.
Another area of vulnerability study is the laser
threat. The P(l/o), " probability of kill given a specific
laser power lock-on for a specified period of time. This
is becoming extremely important with current technology
development.
F. AIRCRAFT SUSCEPTIBILITY ASSESSMENT
The contractor must utilize the results of the Mission
Threat Analysis to conduct a proper susceptibility assess-
ment. Since the susceptibility of an aircraft depends upon
the mission scenario, the threat encountered, and the
aircraft itself, a complete and thorough Mission Threat
Analysis is essential.
The contractor makes judgements and assessments based
on the conceptual design, known or proposed tactics,
aircraft designed performance, the characteristics of the
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threat, its lethality, and the environment to assess how
well an aircraft can avoid being damaged' while performing
its assigned mission. Or it can be stated that the
contractor uses all weapons, aircraft, and environmental
data to determine the net probability the aircraft is hit
by the damage mechanism.
There are several specific weapons and aircraft
parameters that the contractor must consider when
performing this assessment.







-command and control interfaces
(2) The aircraft parameters include:
-detectable signatures (IR, RCS, aural)
-counter measures
-tactics
-flight path and performance
The contractor must make trade-off studies, especially
in the conceptual design phase, during a susceptibility
assessment. For example, industry must weigh the advan-
tages/penalties in weight and cost replacing conventional
nozzles with 2-D nozzles to reduce the IR signature of an
exhaust system. Or, adding a more powerful jammer based on
the perceived threat, and fighting with the weight, cost
and size parameters inherent in such a decision. There are
many analytical processes involved in this type of
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analysis; the contractor must document each analysis and
produce the most efficient solution to the aircraft's
susceptibility.
G. AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT
The Survivability Assesment is the capstone of the
survivability program. It is the culmination of a quan-
titative measure of the aircraft's survivability. The
contractor must combine the results of all of the above
mentioned assessments and determine the effectiveness of
the weapons system it has designed. Specifically, the
contractor is required by MILSTD 2069 [Ref. l:p. 23] to
complete an assessment using:
(1) The results of the mission threat analysis.
(2) The results of the vulnerability analysis.
(3) The results of the susceptibility analysis.
The assessment should address the following categories:
(1) Laser availability if DOD specifies the need.
(2) System cost effective analysis. This should be
done as trade-off studies to determine the point
where making the plane survivable is no longer cost
effective. A measure of effectiveness is required
for comparison purposes. This will show the
relative effectiveness of a system with its
inherent costs. In the conceptual design phase,
this is limited by the stage of system development.
(3) Survivability enhancement trade-off studies. The
contractor is responsible to provide an in depth
analysis to DOD identifying the effects, benefits
and penalties in survivability enhancement
parameters. A trade-off study shall describe the
survivability enhancement techniques considered;
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and how vulnerability and susceptibility reduc-
tion was realized by the use of these techniques.
Coincident with this should be an assessment on the
aircraft's performance, weight, cost, reliability,
etc., if such an enhancement were incorporated.
The contractor's development of a survivability assess-
ment is critical to the design of the aircraft. The con-
ceptual/preliminary phase, with its degree of freedom,
makes it an excellent phase to assess a system, from both
cost effective and performance points of view.
H. COMBAT DAMAGE REPAIR ASSESSMENT
The contractor must design a repairable system. For a
survivability program, the contractor estimates the man-
hours, costs, logistics and repair levels of the aircraft
in a combat environment. In the conceptual/preliminary
design phase, the contractor must highlight design items
for quick turn-around fixes; i.e., those he feels are
inherent in the design of the system. He must, if able,
identify and describe complete repairs and proposed levels
for major repair systems. Finally, he must identify those
spare parts which would require a long lead time in pro-
curement; and the amount of parts stocking required for a
combat environment.
MILSTD 2069 [Ref. 1] concludes its documentation of the
groundwork for survivability program by briefly discussing
the required survivability enhancement features that are to
be considered in a design. These are too numerous to
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discuss individually. The conceptual design phase requires
that enhancement features be the basis for trade-off stud-
ies. The design survivability enhancement features will
discussed in the case study in the FMECA, then engineering
analysis will be used to recommend improvements in the
design including incorporation of applicable enhancement
features listed in MILSTD 2069 [Ref. l:pp. 25-35].
The following chapters encompass the case study itself.




The aircraft used for this case study is the result of
a course the author took at NPS . An RFP was developed by
Professor R.D. Zucker to be used as the basis for the de-
sign. It is a generic, unclassified RFP, having no known
connection to any existing or proposed weapons system. The
RFP was presented as follows.




Light/medium weight attack aircraft,
land or carrier based.
1 (single seat)
4 cruise missiles (1200 lbs. each)
4 sidewinder missiles (190 lbs.
each)
-PROPULSION SYSTEM: generic "rubber engine" capable of







Mach 1.1 (dash speed-total mission
may be subsonic)
.
3000 ft. (from land)
3500 ft. (to land)
Low level ordnance delivery from ei-
ther carrier or land base, with full
payload and no external fuel.
(See V. Mission Threat Analysis)
High level ordnance delivery from
either carrier or land base, with
full payload and no external fuel.
(See V. Mission Threat Analysis)
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-MANEUVERABILITY: Design load factor— 8 g's.
Sustained turn rate at P(s) = is
4 g's at Mach 0.8 and 30,000 ft.
Instantaneous turn rate at 8 g's is
16 degrees per second at the "corner
speed and 30,000 ft.
From this RFP and course material, the conceptual
design of the A-20 ELIMINATOR was created (See Figures 4.1
and 4.2). Because the purpose of this case study is to
assess the vulnerability of the aircraft in the conceptual/
preliminary design stage, the majority of work involved in
creating the response to the RFP has been omitted. This
response, which was supposed to represent a defense
contractor's submission of a proposed design, required 175
pages to complete. For this reason, a summary of design
and performance specifications for the ELIMINATOR follows.
B. DESIGN SUMMARY
Total Airplane
Overall length 48.2 3 ft
Overall height 15.20 ft
Wing
Area (S) 415.4 ft
Span (b) 38.129 ft
Aspect Ratio (AR) 3.5
Chords
Root Chord 17.4 3 ft
Tip Chord 4.4 ft
MAC 12.2 ft
y-MAC 7.6 ft
L.E. Sweep 41.5 deg











Figure 4.1 A-2 ELIMINATOR
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Area (S per tail) 67.6 ft
L.E. Sweep 41.5 deg
Span (exposed per tail) 8.25 ft
Taper Ratio 0.48
Chords
Root Chord 10.0 ft






Area (S per tail) 52.8 ft
L.E. Sweep 41,45 deg
Span (exposed per tail) 8.0 ft
Taper Ratio 0.342
Chords
Root Chord 9 . 5 f
t












Maximum Thrust at Sea Level 38600 lbf






Main Landing Gear (single tire)
Diameter 28.7 in
Width 8.6 in
Wheel Diameter 13.4 in
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Main Landing Gear Shock
Stroke 25 in
Strut Diameter 4 . 1 in
Minimum Shock Length 5.2 ft
Nose Landing Gear (dual tire)
Diameter 21.5 in
Width 6.8 in
Wheel Diameter 10.1 in
Nose Landing Gear Shock
Stroke 24.2 in
Strut Diameter 2.0 in
Minimum Shock Length 5.04 ft
Balance Parameters
Static Tail Down Angle 15.0 deg
Turnover Angle 53.97 deg
-AERODYNAMICS SUMMARY
Design Lift Coefficient (Mach 0.87) 0.254
Maneuvering Devices
L.E. Flaps 0-34 deg defl
T.E. Flaps 0-17 deg defl
-PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
Take-off distance 1706 ft
Landing distance 3535 ft
Maximum Speed
Sea level with AB/without AB 1.04M/0.8M
3 00 00 ft with AB/without AB 1.1M/0.9M
For the purpose of this case study, the author went
beyond the purely conceptual design arena into some
preliminary design work; creating and sizing the aircraft's
subsystems, such as the hydraulics, flight controls,
propulsion, etc. This was done to ensure a realistic
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component base for the case study. This design work was
based on existing systems in the inventory and current
developments and technology in aircraft design.
It was not the author's intent to design the most
survivable aircraft possible. The A-2 was designed to be
representative of current technology. The survivability
features inherent in the design will only lead to a better
understanding of the methodology used in the assessment.
52
V. A-2 MISSION THREAT ANALYSIS
The Mission Threat Analysis is the first step in an
aircraft survivability assessment. Background on the
methodology for the Mission Threat Analysis is found in
Chapter 3 of Ball [Ref. 2], Specifically, Section 3.7
(pages 115-116) presents the steps Ball delineates as
necessary for a proper assessment.
A. MISSION ANALYSIS
The Mission Analysis for an aircraft in the concep-
tual/preliminary design phase is driven by the RFP. For the
A-2 0, the RFP requires the primary mission to be a high-
low/low-high mission with speeds and altitudes depicted
generically in Figure 5.1. The ordnance load is dependent
upon target selection and intelligence. The alternate
mission is stated in the RFP as a high-high/high-high
mission profile as depicted generically in Figure 5.2.
Again the ordnance load is dependent upon target selection
and intelligence.
From the design standpoint, the A-20 is a multi-mission
attack aircraft. It is designed to deliver ordnance on a
designated target in a variety of roles that fit both the




5 6 7 12
0-1 Taxi and take-off
1-2 Climb to 30,000 ft. cruise altitude
2-3 Cruise at 0.75 Mach for 250 NM to ingress area
3-4 Descend to ingress point (sea level)
4-5 Ingress 50 NM at 0.9 Mach to target area
5-6 Low altitude ordnance delivery on target
6-7 Fly 50 NM to egress point at 0.9 Mach
7-8 Climb to 30,000 ft. cruise altitude
8-9 Cruise at 0.8 Mach for 250 NM to descent point
9-10
. Descend to loiter altitude
10-11 Loiter at 0.27 Mach at sea level for 20 minutes
11-12 Approach, land and taxi to ramp
Figure 5.1 Generic High-Low/Low-High Mission
54
3 v4 5
. i \ .
1 7 8
0-1 Taxi and take-off
1-2 Climb to 3 0,000 ft. cruise altitude
2-3 Cruise at 0.75 Mach for 353 NM to target area
3-4 High altitude ordnance delivery on target
4-5 Cruise at 0.8 Mach for 353 NM to descent point
5-6 Descend to loiter altitude
6-7 Loiter at 0.27 Mach, at sea level for 20 minutes
7-8 Approach, land and taxi to ramp
Figure 5.2 Generic High-High/High-High Mission
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air support/tactical interdiction, surface combatant de-
struction, armed reconnaissance and defense suppression.
Of the missions mentioned, the close air support/
tactical interdiction mission was selected for case study
evaluation. This mission requires the aircraft to be
exposed to surface and air threats from either sea or land
based systems. The RFP requires an assessment from both sea
and land based operating theaters. The spectrum of threats
that the A-20 could be exposed to covers the majority of
the Soviet naval and cities defense inventory.
Specific missions as conceived by the author can be
seen in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. The aircraft can be deployed
from either sea or land based assets and can fly the
mission profile as depicted to either high or low level
ordnance delivery, depending upon mission requirements.
This case study will examine the threats expected in the
low level scenario.
The A-20 leaves it base of operations (either carrier
for USN or land for USAF) and proceeds to fly the high-
low/low-high mission. Figure 5.3 shows the combat radius
to be approximately 300 NM. This mission assumes no
external tanks or in-flight refueling.
The tactics conceived for an attack mission of this
type are those which are characteristic of attack aircraft
currently in the US inventory. Depending on the ordnance
to be delivered, these tactics could encompass a low
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Figure 5.4 A-2 High-High/High-High Mission
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altitude evasive ingress and pop-up ordnance delivery (for
bombs and cruise missiles stored in the weapons bay— see
Figure 5.5), a straight-in high speed strafing run
(utilizing the 20 mm cannon), or a jinking-maneuvering air-




Because of the conceived design versatility of the A-
20, the threats it could encounter in a hostile environment
encompass the majority of Soviet SAM/AAA arsenal. Over
land, the A-2 could encounter anything from a ZSU-2 3-4
"Shilka" to an SA-7 or SA-9 site. At sea the threats are
just as numerous; the A-2 could anticipate encounter
conditions with 7 6 mm AAA or any one of the SAN systems.
Because this case study is using the close air sup-
port/tactical interdiction mission for an analysis, the
threat to be assessed is narrowed down to the following
representative, generic, system:
(1) SA-X, a generic IR homing missile. The fragment
size is 100 grains for analysis.
This threat was chosen because of its utility against
low level targets and its strategic importance to the
Soviet defense plan. This assessment will determine the
single hit vulnerability values of the A-20 for this threat
propagator based on engineering evaluations of the
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Figure 5.5 A-20 Conceptual Tactics
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conceptual/preliminary design. Specifically, the component
and aircraft probabilities of kill given a hit, the
component and aircraft probabilities of survival given a
hit, and the component and aircraft vulnerable areas.
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VI. A-20 FLIGHT AND MISSION ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
The methodology for this task is found in both Chapter
2 and Chapter 5 of Ball [Ref. 2]. In Chapter 2, pages 39-
60, Ball discusses a tactical aircraft and its systems in
detail to help the reader learn the major components and
their importance. In Chapter 5, pages 138-140, Ball
presents the methodology to conduct the Flight and Mission
Essential Function portion of the analysis.
Flight and Mission Essential Functions are those
functions that must be properly performed in order for the
aircraft to complete its mission. These functions are also
known as "critical" functions. They are functions that
must be performed by each of the aircraft's systems, sub-
systems and components to meet the survival requirements of
each applicable kill category; either conventional attri-
tion or mission abort. The kill category selected for this
case study is the attrition kill. The attrition kill is a
measure of the degree of aircraft damage which renders it
incapable of continued conventional flight. This results
in a crash with damage beyond that of economic repair, and
a loss of the aircraft from the inventory. The level of
attrition kill selected for analysis is the "5 minute A-
level kill" as described by Ball [Ref. 2:p. 136].
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Required mission functions are those necessary to
conduct the missions determined by the Mission Threat
Analysis in the previous chapter. These missions can be
divided into separate and distinct phases in order to
determine which subsystem contributes to a mission
essential function, a flight essential function (such as
Lift, Thrust or Control) , or both. There are several
phases common to all the missions discussed. They are:
(1) mission planning
(2) man up/take off
(3) rendezvous, climb to cruise altitude
(4) fly tactical profile
(5) rendezvous, climb to cruise altitude
(6) descend to marshall/begin approach
(7) carrier arrestment/land
From the case study standpoint, the most critical phase
of the analysis is phase four, the tactical profile phase.
The aircraft must be able to fly and perform its designed
tactical mission of delivering ordnance during this phase.
Since the methodology is the same for all seven phases,
only that involving phase four will be demonstrated. Phase
four may be further broken down into subphases to deter-
mine subsystem contributions.
(4) Fly Tactical Profile
subphases
-descend to ingress point
-descend to tactical low level altitude, commence
evasive flight profile
-search and acquire target
-perform tactical weapons delivery maneuver
-weapons release
-resume evasive flight profile to egress point
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For case study purposes, the aircraft is composed of a
number of systems that can be broken down into various
subsystems that affect its ability to fly in a controlled
flight environment and to conduct and complete its mission
[Ref. 2: pp. 39-60]. Table 6.1 shows the aircraft broken
down into various systems and subsystems with the functions
of each listed.
Using the subphases determined from the mission profile
phase and the systems and subsystems (and their functions)
as noted in Table 6.1, a table or matrix is developed to
show which systems are required during each subphase of the
tactical profile. Table 6.2 is a summary of the final
analysis of the Mission and Flight Essential Functions for
the tactical profile phase of the overall mission. For
this table, each function of the system and subsystem was
evaluated to determine its participation in the success of
the overall phase. As can be seen, some systems and sub-
systems contribute to both the flight and mission success
of the phase; while others, such as the avionics, contrib-
ute to only the mission portion of the tactical profile
phase.
This method of analysis is done for each one of the
mission phases. This analysis of which systems and
subsystems provide the essential functions is the first
step in determining each system's and subsystem's critical
components. Now that this chapter has presented the
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TABLE 6.1 SYSTEMS/SUBSYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONS
System/Subsystem Function




























Provide control of engine
power output.
Provide complete mechanical
back-up control in case of
Automatic Flight Controls
failure. Provide pilot in-
put to control surfaces.
Provide electrical signals
to all flight control sur-
faces.
Electrical System Provide electrical power





Store and deliver fuel to
engines.
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Provide hydraulic power from
at least one system to move
primary control surfaces,
weapons bay door actuators,
cannon, landing gear, etc.
.
Carry structural loads and
provide for structural
integrity of the aircraft.
Provide required air condi-











Provide pilot monitoring and
control of subsystems.
Display information
Air Data Equipment Acquire, process and
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flight and mission essential functions methodology of the
A-20, the next chapter will provide the Failure Mode, Ef-
fects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) for the aircraft.
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VII. A-2 FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
The methodology for the Failure Mode, Effects, and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is presented by Ball [Ref. 2]
in Chapter Five. The FMECA is broken down into two parts,
a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and a Damage
Modes and Effects Analysis (DMEA) . Also included in this
section (but not actually part of the FMECA as required by
MILSTD 2069) , is a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) . The FTA
is an alternate, and very effective, approach to identi-
fying the critical components of a system. Each of these
tasks will be applied to the aircraft using the method-
ology found on pages 138-153 of Ball [Ref. 2].
A. A-2 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)
When a survivability analysis is conducted on a design,
the FMEA is normally provided by engineers who are concern-
ed with system safety, reliability and maintainability. It
is based on design requirements, historical data (if the
system is still in concept stage)
,
predicted performance
measurements and sound engineering judgement. This analysis
is not concerned with the cause, but with the effect. The
FMEA for this case study is presented in two parts: (1) the
systems descriptions and (2) the results of the analysis in
tabular format.
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The major input to the FMEA is the physical and func-
tional description of the aircraft and its subsystems and
the data obtained from the Flight and Mission Essential
Functions Analysis. For an aircraft in the conceptual/pre-
liminary design phase, this consists of conceptual drawings
and narrative descriptions of what the designer thinks the
aircraft should look like and be capable of.
The FMEA is usually a single component failure analy-
sis. It is a procedure that does not look at the cause of
failure, but at the component failure itself and its effect
upon the system; i.e., can it (the subsystem and system)
still perform its essential functions with this component
damaged. In other words, how does the failure of the com-
ponent affect the subsystems operating ability; which in
turn affects the systems operating ability.
The FMEA for this case study is presented below in two
parts: (1) the systems descriptions and (2) the results of
the analysis in tabular format.
1. Systems Descriptions
Conceptual drawings (see Figures 7.1 through 7.6)
and a brief description of the Fuel, Hydraulics, Flight
Controls, Propulsion, Armament and Structural Systems of
the case study aircraft follows. These subsystems were
chosen for analysis because they are the major subsystems
of the aircraft and are well developed in the conceptual/
preliminary design phase. Also, each of these subsystems
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has an affect on the ability of the aircraft to perform its
essential functions in the tactical subphase (as determined
in the Flight and Mission Essential Functions analysis)
.
a. The Fuel System
The A-20 fuel system consists of fuel storage
and transfer tanks, plumbing, on board and in-flight fuel-
ing and refueling devices, and associated filters and
pressurization system. As seen in Figure 7.1, there are
six internal tanks: four fuselage tanks, and two integral
wing tanks. In addition, there is a vent tank located in
each vertical stabilizer. The A-20 also has the capability
to carry a centerline mounted external fuselage tank.
The internal fuel system is designed to carry
10,400 pounds of fuel. The two fuselage tanks located
longitudinally along either side of the weapons bay serve
as transfer tanks. The integral wing tanks also serve as
transfer tanks. The aft fuselage tank, located in the
underside of the aircraft, is also a transfer tank, but can
be switched to a feed tank for either engine if necessary.
The forward fuselage tank is the primary feed to both of
the engines with each engine having a separate feed line
from this tank. This tank is non-transferable and carries
the "get-home" fuel. The forward and aft tanks are both
self sealing. All tanks have fire/explosion suppresion
foam installed in the ullage. The vent tanks in the verti-
cal tails are designed to collect fuel that happens to get
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Figure 7.1 A-2 Fuel System
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into the venting lines during high "g" maneuvers. It is
collected in these tanks and gravity fed back into the fuel
system.
As with most Navy fuel systems, fuel transfer
is accomplished by motive flow, thus eliminating the need
for electrical power to feed the engines. The transfer
system can automatically sequence fuel to keep the feed
tanks full for maximum engine performance; or the pilot can
select fuel transfer manually under failure conditions.
The automatic transfer is designed to take into account
weapons release and burned fuel to maintain a relatively
constant center of gravity location through all flight
regimes.
As can be seen from Figure 7.1, the majority of
the plumbing for the fuel system is within the tanks, help-
ing to eliminate excess exposed surface area. The motive
flow and boost pumps are driven off the accessories sec-
tion. Boost and motive flow pumps are both three stage,
single shaft pumps. These pumps operate by the venturi
principle with regards to pressure and flow rates,
b. The Hydraulic System
The hydraulic system supplies hydraulic power
to all flight control surfaces, the landing gear brakes,
the cannon drive, the weapons bay doors, the landing gear
mechanism, and the nose wheel steering.
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Figure 7.2 A-20 Hydraulics System
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The hydraulic system, shown in Figure 7.2, con-
sists of two independent hydraulic systems with two inde-
pendent circuits in each system. There are three hydraulic
reservoirs; one is always in backup for the other two.
Each system is driven by an engine driven pump with elec-
trical backup at a pressure of 3000 psi. Each system is
capable of supplying hydraulic power to all flight con-
trol surfaces. The systems are monitored constantly by a
control network for correct pressure and flow. The system
can direct flow through one circuit while cutting off the
flow in another. The control network can shut off one
hydraulic system with automatic switching that is dependent
on system pressure and flow rate. If the pressure in one
system drops below 1200 psi. , flow to this system is cut
off and the backup reservoir comes on line to that system.
c. The Flight Control System
The flight control system of the A-2 is shown
in Figure 7.3. It is actually three independent control
systems, two electrical and one mechanical. There is an on
board Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) , with a separ-
ate circuit for each one of the two flight control compu-
ters. The flight control computers are located in the
forward electronics bay, just aft of the radome, and in the
aft electronics bay, behind the cockpit. All control sur-
faces can be controlled by any one of the three systems.
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In normal operation, all control responses are
due to electrical transmissions received from control stick
and rudder inputs. At the same time stick and rudder pedal
inputs are mechanically backed up through standard pulleys
and linkages. All control surface movements come from hy-
draulic boost response to electrical or mechanical inputs.
In the event of a hydraulic problem, the mechanical system
can control the airplane without the boost system.
The aircraft is controlled in all three axis by
the two flight control computers equipped with their own
accelerometers, rate sensors, stick force and rudder pedal
transducer inputs. Each computer has two channels, and
each has the capacity to process all inputs and perform all
necessary computations to fly the aircraft. In effect,
there is multiple redundancy in the flight control system
with both electrical and mechanical backups.
d. The Propulsion System
The propulsion system proposed for the A-20 is
of 1990' s technology. It is powered by a derivative of
current development engines. The thrust capability of
these engines is 20,000 pounds thrust per engine in maximum
afterburner at sea level.
As shown in Figure 7.4, the propulsion system
has a unique intake arrangement. Designed with surviv-
ability in mind, the intake wraps around the top of the
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Figure 7.4 A-2 Propulsion System
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fuselage, with the wings adding protection against projec-
tile penetration.
The design engine in the A-20 is a low by-pass
turbo fan engine. A three stage fan and an eight stage
compressor are each driven by a single stage turbine. The
compressor is of variable geometry with continuous by-pass
from the fan to the augmentation section. There is no
acceleration bleed system required for the engine.
For combustion, the engine is equipped with a
flow through annular type combustor utilizing eight combus-
tion cans each of which has four atomizing fuel nozzles.
The burning gases are directed rearward through a single
stage turbine which drives the fan and the high pressure
rotors.
Augmentation is continuous and in all ranges of
operation. The afterburner operates with injected fuel
through six manifolds located in the exhaust core and fan
discharge stream. Ignition is caused by a fuel rich
mixture torching through the turbine stage to the manifold
and flame holder. Fan discharge air cools the after burner
liner in the duct and and helps maintain a low exterior
skin temperature on the engine covers. The variable area
nozzle is hydraulically actuated with its own hydraulic
system.
Each engine is independently controlled with
single throttle actuation by the pilot. The engine control
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then programs the variable nozzle area, temperature levels,
turbine speeds and correct fuel flow for proper and effi-
cient operation.
The lubrication system is self contained for
each engine. The capacity of the system is 4.5 gallons, of
which 4.0 is useable. The bearing system is composed of
three bearings for the fan rotor and two bearings for the
high pressure rotor. The low pressure rotor bearings
support the fan forward on the front frame, aft on the mid
frame, and the aft end of the fan turbine in the turbine
frame.
The high pressure rotor is supported by a
thrust bearing at the forward end in the mid frame and by a
differential bearing at the aft end of the turbine with the
fan rotor.
Electrical power for engine start and electri-
cal control is supplied by the alternator. Ignition is
automatic depending on the system requirements.
The accessory gearbox drives one level of
hydraulic power, the electrical generators and other
miscellaneous uses. Bleed air from high and low stage
compressors is utilized for auxiliary equipment operation
such as engine anti-ice and the environmental control
system.
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e. The Armament System
The Armament System is shown in Figure 7.5.
The design of the A-2 incorporates a weapons bay.
Tradeoff studies revealed that the aircraft, with its
unique intake system, needed the majority of the stores to
be internal to sustain efficient high speed operations.
The A-20 is a heavily armed aircraft. There
are four sidewinder missile mounts on the exterior; one on
each wing tip and one each at the fuselage and wing
underside junction.
The weapons bay has the capacity to carry
either four cruise missiles or a combination of bombs/mis-
siles with a total interior weapons load weight of 6,500
pounds. The weapons bay doors are both hydraulically and
electrically actuated, and fold into themselves for drag
reduction.
Mounted on the left hand interior of the fuse-
lage, adjacent to the cockpit, is a 20 mm cannon with a
capacity of 2,000 rounds per minute.
All weapons selection controls are on the
pilot's control stick and throttle controls, giving him the
capability to select, arm, and fire the weapon without ever
taking his hands off the primary controls.
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Figure 7.5 A-2 Armament System
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f. The Structural System
The A-20 structure groups (Figure 7.6) are the
nose radome, the weapons bay, the crew station, the forward
fuselage, the center fuselage, the aft fuselage, the in-
board wing section, the outboard wing section, the vertical
stabilizers and the horizontal stabilators.
The nose radome provides an electronically
transparent window for radar transmissions. It is a struc-
tural member, housing the forward avionics bay and semi-
monocoque in construction.
The crew station is directly aft of the radome
section. It has a canopy enclosed cockpit and provides an
oxygen environment for the pilot. All pilot controls and
features are in the cockpit. There is an ejection seat,
center mounted control stick and side mounted throttles.
The pilot can control all flight mission essential systems
from these control mounts.
The weapons bay is located beneath and aft of
the cockpit, one third of the distance along the length of
the fuselage. It consists of a cavity large enough to
carry four cruise missiles twelve feet in length. It is
convertible to other types of ordnance. The weapons bay in
itself is a structural member, built as one unit to be
installed in the fuselage.
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Figure 7.6 A-2 Structural System
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The forward fuselage is conventionally con-
structed with multi-stiffened longerons and is semi-
monocoque. It is strengthened for a 20 mm cannon located
adjacent to the pilot on the port side. It provides a
structural bulkhead for the forward avionics bay and com-
pletely supports the aft bay. It also provides attachment
bulkheads for the forward portion of the weapons bay and
the forward fuselage fuel tank. Structurally, the forward
fuselage has major longerons, shear webs, bulkheads and
floors. It is compartmented for strength and ease of
maintenance.
The center fuselage carries the wrap around
intake system, the forward fuselage transfer tank, the wing
carry through box, roots, and wing attachment points. It
also has the main landing gear supports, assorted struc-
tural members, and the aft mounting bulkhead for the
weapons bay. The backup hydraulic reservoir and pump are
located on the starboard side and there is also fuselage
mounted sidewinder stations beneath the wing.
The aft fuselage consists of the engine bay
cavities, a longitudinal alloyed bulkhead between the en-
gines, horizontal stabilator attachments, vertical stabil-
izer attachments, tail hook and speed brake assembly. Also
the primary hydraulic reservoirs are located adjacent to
the engine accessory drives.
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The inboard wing consists of the wing box, wing
root, and integral fuel tank. There is a three cell torque
box and the flap structure. The leading edge is extendable
with the necessary hydraulic and electrical equipment
located within. The wing spars and ribs are all machined
and cast aluminum. The skin is both aluminum and graphite
epoxy composites.
The outboard wing section consists of a
multispar, multibox structure which extends from the fold
joint to the wing tip. There is no fuel in this section,
but it does have an outboard sidewinder installation pod
located on the tip. There is also the remaining leading
edge extension plumbing and an aileron which extends along
the entire outboard section. The materials used in this
section are primarily graphite epoxy for the skin and cast
aluminum for the spars.
The vertical stabilizers are mounted with an
eighty one degree dihedral on the aft fuselage assembly.
They carry the vent tanks and navigation lights and consist
of three spars and four box beams. The skin covering is
aluminum and fiberglass. The moving control surfaces are
made from graphite epoxy composites.
The horizontal stabilators are constructed
entirely of graphite epoxy composites and fiberglass. They
have a honey combed interior and rotate upon a titanium al-
loy hub.
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As can be seen from the preceeding figures and
discussion, the A-20 was designed for ease of major main-
tenance and combat damage repair.
2 . Analysis Results
Consistent with the format previously established,
the fuel system will be the only system broken down into
detail and analyzed using the FMEA methodology to produce
the final product, Table 7.1, the FMEA Matrix.
The fuel system components have been analyzed to
determine how they could fail and what effect this failure
has on the system. Results of the FMEA analysis performed
on the fuel system are shown in Table 7.1. The most
important result of this analysis is the input it provides
to the preparation of the list of critical components,
which is the output of the assessment.
B. A-2 DAMAGE MODE EFFECTS AND ANALYSIS (DMEA)
The DMEA is dependent upon the kill criteria and the
threat. It relates potential failures such as those de-
termined in the FMEA, with the threat weapons and their
damage mechanisms. It also associates the effects of the
failures to the kill criterion, redundancy and flight con-
ditions and provides the checklist for the final determin-
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Normally a DMEA is comprised of four sets of ouput
data: (1) The DMEA Tables, (2) The Disablement Diagrams,
(3) The Kill (or Fault) Trees or Kill Diagrams and (4) The
P(k/h) Functions. In this case study all four of these
data will be presented. A Fault Tree Analysis is also
included in this section. As mentioned earlier, this, is
not required by MILSTD 2069 [Ref . 1] . It is being
presented here because it is an alternate and extremely
effective method of component identification.
Since the FTA is being used in this analysis, the
presentation of DMEA results will be in a different order
than defined by MILSTD 2069 [Ref. 1]
.
The results will be presented as follows: The DMEA
Tables and The Disablement Diagrams are developed for the
fuel system only; following the routine established in
earlier sections. The FTA is presented next not only for
the fuel system, but for the entire aircraft. This is done
to show how effective the FTA is and to show that the depth
of analysis makes it an excellent alternative to the FMEA.
The list of critical components is presented in conjunction
with the FTA. This was done to show how this list is the
logical result and product of the FMEA, DMEA Tables,
Disablement Diagrams and FTA. The Kill Tree is presented
next. This is also created for the entire aircraft, giving
a visual presentation of the critical components and
redundancy relationships The final data presented are
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P(k/h) Functions. They are presented in conjunction with a
representative list of critical components from the entire
aircraft. This part of the assessment is presented last to
allow for input to the list from every possible source of
analysis.
According to MILSTD 2069 [Ref. l:p. 15], the list of
critical components is complete after creating the DMEA
Matrix. By performing the analysis of the A-2 in the
order discussed, the author feels a more complete and
thorough list of critical components is the end result.
1. The DMEA Matrix
The DMEA Matrix for the Fuel System is shown in
Table 7.2. This matrix relates the components and their
failure modes to the probability of kill given a hit
functions (P(k/h)), kill criterion, and the redundancy
categories in a tabular format.
As seen from Table 7.2, not all of the components
of the fuel system are considered critical for the level of
kill being analyzed (A-level attrition) . This is one goal
of the DMEA, to determine those components which are
critical to the kill level of the aircraft. Table 7.2
shows the fuel system broken down into sufficient detail to
allow an evaluation of its components and the role they
play in the provision of essential functions. -
Table 7.3 explains the notes found in the remarks
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TABLE 7.3 FUEL SYSTEM DMEA NOTES
F-l: Component not critical for vulnerable area
calculations.
F-2: Location adjacent to weapons bay makes this tank
very important in vulnerable area calculations.
F-3 : Ullage is considered only when tank is less than
50% full.
F-4: Tank has "get home" fuel, can feed both engines
if necessary.
F-5: Tank is kept full by auto-sequencing of fuel
system.
F-6: Bladders and Tanks themselves are not considered
critical for vulnerable area calculation.
F-7 : Lines from feed tank to engines are redundant.
Allows feeding of both engines.
F-8: Most of fuel lines are internal and short as seen
in Figure [7.1]. Rupture of line will not
affect flow in majority of system.
F-9 : Each wing tank has two paths to flow to engine.
Can direct feed is necessary.
F-10: Either vent tank capable of venting system. Vent
hazard is small. Area is not considered in
vulnerable area calculation.
F-ll: Loss of both pumps results in fuel starvation
because of inability to transfer.
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effect the damaged component has on the system. Notice
that several of the remarks refer to the FMEA, an example
of the interrelationship between the types of assessment.
2 . The Disablement Diagram
The second set of data developed in the DMEA is the
Disablement Diagram. The Disablement Diagram combines both
data from the FMEA and DMEA to display:
1. The physical location of components within the
system.
2. The failure mode of a component.
3. The effect of the failure on the subsystem and the
aircraft.
4. The resultant aircraft kill criteria.
Figure 7.7 show the Fuel System Disablement Dia-
grams. The components and subsytems that can if killed
would lead to an attrition kill are exhibited graphically
in flow chart fashion. Note the redundancy in the motive
flow pumps and engine driven fuel systems.
3 . The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
The Fault Tree Analysis, (the output of which is
known as the Fault Tree Diagram or Failure Analysis Logic
Tree {FALT}), is not specifically required by MILSTD 2069
[Ref. 1] as a means of determining the critical components
of the system. However, it is often used as a substitute
for the FMEA when one is not available. Because of its use
as one of the principal tools of system safety, reliability
and maintainability analyses, it may be preferred over the
102
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Figure 7.7 (cont.) A-20 Fuel System Disablement Diagram
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FMEA. This analysis is valuable in that its logic and
methodology involves development of a system hierarchy in
terms of a specific characteristic, result or effect. As
such it can take into account both hardware failures and
human effects.
The FTA begins with an undesired event, in this
case study an A-level attrition kill. It then logically
determines what event or combination of events (i.e.,
component or subsystem failures due to penetrator damage)
can cause the undesired event to occur.
For most aircraft FTA's, attrition is caused by the
inability of the aircraft to fly or land. For the A-level
attrition, only the inability of the aircraft to fly is
analyzed. The assessment then logically branches down into
a detailed analysis of what can cause the attrition. Ball
[Ref. 2] discusses the FTA and its logic symbology on pages
149-151.
Figure 7.8 and Table 7.4 show the results of the
Fault Tree Analysis performed on the A-20. The Fault Tree
Diagram or FALT is the graphical presentation of the
analysis. Figure 7.8 shows the aircraft and its subsystems
broken down, just like in an FMEA, to determine how the
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Figure 7.8 A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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TABLE 7.4 Al LEFT ENGINE FUEL SYSTEM FAILURE
COMPONENT LIST
COMPONENT




motive flow fuel line














firewall shutoff valve penetration
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Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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inlet case supports R penetration
rotor and stator blades R penetration
front accessory support R penetration




LP rotor and stator blades















forward end thrust bearing
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Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-2 Fault Tree Diagram
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scavenge pump drive shaft
main gear box


















































































Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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TABLE 7.4 (cont.) Jl LOSS OF LEFT WING
COMPONENT LIST
COMPONENT
left front spar cap
left aft spar cap
left #1 spar cap
left #2 spar cap
left #3 spar cap
left #4 spar cap
left front outboard spar cap
left #1 outboard spar cap
left #2 outboard spar cap
left #3 outboard spar cap









i R sever, hydraulic
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R three of six for
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R three of six for
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Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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switching and flow sensor penetration
COMPONENT
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Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 7.3 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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essential dc bus penetration
COMPONENT

























Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 7.8 (cont.) A-20 Fault Tree Diagram
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Table 7.4 lists the A-20's Critical Components by
name, redundancy relationship (R~redundant NR—nonredun-
dant) , and damage or kill mode. These kill modes are
representative of the ones that Ball [Ref. 2] breaks down
by major systems and lists in Table 5 . 1 on page 145 and
then discusses briefly on pages 143-149. The kill modes
listed are the most important and most frequently occurring
modes of attrition.
5. The Kill Tree
The final set of data obtained from the DMEA is the
Kill Tree (also called Fault Tree by MILSTD 2069 [Ref. l:p.
18]). The Kill Tree, shown in Figure 7.9, introduces the
critical components of the A-20 and illustrates their
logical redundancy relationships. The Kill Tree is invalu-
able in that it graphically depicts which components (or
subsystems) must be damaged or lost produce the particular
kill level.
Nonredundant components are those shown in series.
These components, if individually killed, are sufficient to
result in the kill. Redundant components are shown in
parallel with those which they share an operational
redundancy. The word redundant means that the component
plus x (x > 1) or more components must be killed to achieve
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(three out of five)
Figure 7.9 (cont.) A-20 Kill Tree Diagram
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Figure 7.9 (cont.) A-20 Kill Tree Diagram
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A complete cut through of the "trunk" of the Kill
Tree is required to achieve the A-level attrition kill of
the A-2 0. In portions of the tree where there are
redundant relationships (such as the fuel system, the
flight control system, the propulsion system or the
hydraulics) , it is easily seen how this redundancy enhances
the survivability of the A-20. The more redundant the
systems are, the harder it is to obtain the A-level kill.
The values of vulnerability determined in the vulnerability
assessment portion of this case study will show this
quantitatively
.
6 . P(k/h) Functions and Critical Components
The culmination of the FMEA and DMEA is the listing
of the P(k/h) functions for the critical components. A
representative list of the critical components presented in
Table 7.4 is given in Table 7.5 This list of critical
components is not comprehensive for the whole aircraft. It
is made up of selected components from each major sub-
system. This was done to enable the reader to more easily
grasp the methodology of the assessment, instead of being
burdened with trying to assimilate a very long and detailed
list. Both redundant and nonredundant components are
listed to ensure a thorough vulnerability assessment and
treatment of component redundancy.
The probability of kill given a hit functions
(P(k/h)) are the first quantitative measures of the
153
TABLE 7.5 CRITICAL COMPONENT LIST
BY MAJOR SYSTEMS GROUPING
MAJOR SYSTEMS P(k/h) VALUES FOR 100






Left Inlet Duct 0.5
Right Inlet Duct 0.5
Left Throttle Actuator 0.8
Right Throttle Actuator 0.8
Engine Mounts
Left Mount Forward 0.3
Right Mount Forward .
3
Left Mount Aft 0.2





Stick Sensor Transducer 0.5
Hydraulics Systems
( No. 1, 2 and Backup)
Hydraulic Pump No. 1 0.4
Hydraulic Pump No. 2 0.4
Hydraulic Circuit 1A 0.5
Hydraulic Circuit IB 0.5
Hydraulic Circuit 2A 0.5
Hydraulic Circuit 2B 0.5
No. 1 Accumulator 0.7
Backup Reservoir 0.6
Backup Switching/Sensing Monitor 0.4
Left Aileron Actuator 0.35
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TABLE 7.5 (cont.) CRITICAL COMPONENT LIST
BY MAJOR SYSTEMS GROUPING
MAJOR SYSTEMS
GROUPING
P(k/h) VALUES FOR 10
GRAIN FRAGMENT @ 4 000 FPS
(uninstalled)
Hydraulics Systems





Left Aileron Sensing Valve
Right Rudder Sensing Valve








Left Fuel System Ullage
Fuel in Motive Flow Lines
Fuel in Wing Tanks
Fuel in Forward Feed Tank
Fuel in Aft Transfer Tank
Wing Tank Ullage





AFCS No. 1 (gyro stabilizer, accel-
erometer, rate/motion sensor)





















TABLE 7.5 (cont.) CRITICAL COMPONENT LIST
BY MAJOR SYSTEMS GROUPING
MAJOR SYSTEMS
GROUPING
P(k/h) VALUES FOR 100










Middle Canopy Frame Support
Forward Longerons
Aft Longerons
Left Wing inboard Spar Caps
















aircraft's survivability. They are a measure of the prob-
ability of component kill when impacted by a fragment.
Normally, the P(k/h) functions are listed as a 2-axis graph
(see Figure 3.7), relating the damage mechanism's size and
velocity at impact. For example (from Figure 3.7), the
P(k/h) value for a 120 grain fragment travelling at 4000
feet per second is 0.62. This method of analysis involves
many man-hours at test facilities for ballistic testing of
the projectile and resultant component damage. The P(k/h)
values determined from these functions are computed for the
uninstalled component and are employed for all attack
directions and impacts anywhere on the component.
For this case study the presentation of assessment
methodology is the goal. For this reason, the list of
critical components has a respective P(k/h) value, not
function, assigned to each component. These values are
for generic components and are not based on any actual
aircraft. They are based on the assumption of the
uninstalled component being struck by a single fragment at
a velocity of 4000 feet per second (fps) . These values
will be used as the starting point or baseline values in
the vulnerability assessment. The location of the
component inside the system and the aircraft structure has
a definite influence on its ultimate numerical value for
probability of kill given a hit. Component and structural
shielding reduces the velocity of the damage mechanism
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and as such its lethality. This results in a change in the
P(k/h) values for the components used in the assessment.
This change, and the detailed reasoning behind it, will be
described in the vulnerability assessment in the next
chapter.
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VIII. A-20 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
The vulnerability assessment of the A-20 will be the
final survivability program task performed in this case
study. The methodology for this assessment is found in
Chapter 5 of Ball [Ref. 2:pp. 153-221]. Ball presents all
the possible techniques and situations for vulnerability
assessment, ranging from single hit vulnerability for a
non-explosive penetrator or fragment (pages 158-158) , to
multiple hit vulnerability (pages 169-180) , to vulnerabil-
ity to internally and externally detonating warheads (pages
183-191)
.
This assessment of the A-20 will determine the air-
craft's vulnerability to a single fragment. The damage
mechanism used is the 100 grain fragment from the SA-X, the
same one that the uninstalled P(k/h) values are based on.
The methodology used for the single hit vulnerability is
essentially the same as that used by the computer programs
FASTGEN and COVART [Ref. 2:pp. 192-195]. In these pro-
grams, the single hit vulnerable area of the aircraft and
it's components can be assessed from 2 6 different aspects
(Figure 8.1). For the A-20 assessment, the 45 degree azi-
muth and 45 degree elevation aspect (Figure 8.2) will be
used to show the methodology involved in obtaining numeri-
cal values for the single hit vulnerability of the A-20.
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Figure 8 . 1 The Aircraft Assessment Aspects
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Figure 8.2 A-2 Assessment Aspect
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In order to simulate the FASTGEN/COVART computer analy-
sis, a grid with sections measuring 5 feet by 5 feet is
superimposed over the A-20 (Figure 8.3). Each 5 foot by 5
foot section is subdivided into 25 one square foot cells to
provide a uniform grid cell area to work from. A shotline
is randomly located in each of the one square foot cells.
These shotlines will be followed as they travel completely
through the aircraft.
For the sake of simplicity, just three shotlines will
be examined in detail (Figure 8.3). These shotlines illus-
trate the different types of component situations that may
be encountered when doing a single hit vulnerability asses-
sment on an aircraft. These situations are:
1. Nonredundant components with overlap, (shotline 1)
2. Redundant components with no overlap, (shotline 2)
3. Redundant components with overlap. (shotline 3)
Figures 8.4 through 8.9 show the shotlines passing through
the various critical components. Table 8.1 is the list of
components that lie on each shotline.
A. VULNERABILITY CALCULATIONS
For each shotline situation assessed, the component
presented area is the area of one cell in the grid, i.e.
2
one square foot (1 ft. ). The P(k/h) values of the com-
ponents will be affected by their location within the
162
Figure 3.3 A-20 Shotlme Grid
163
Figure 8.4 Fuel System Shotline Intercepts
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Figure 8.5 Hydraulic System Shotline Intercepts
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Figure 8.6 Flight Controls System Shotline Intercepts
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Figure 8.7 Propulsion System Shotline Intercepts
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Figure 8.8 Armament System Shotline Intercepts
168
Figure 8.9 Structural System Shotline Intercepts
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TABLE 8.1
CRITICAL COMPONENTS INTERSECTED BY SHOTLINES
Shotline No. 1
1. Pilot
2. Mechanical Stabilator Linkage
3. Right Longitudinal Transfer Tank
4
.
Forward Keel Right Longeron
Shotline No. 2
1. Left Inlet Duct
2 Forward Feed Tank
3. Hydraulic Feed Line Circuit No. 1
4. Mechanical Aileron Linkage Mechanism
5. Outboard Starboard Missile Motor
6. Right Longitudinal Transfer Tank
7 Center Keel Right Longeron
Shotline No. 3
1. Aft Side Left Longeron
2. Left Rudder Hydraulic Actuator
3 Left Engine
4 Left Fuel Vent Line
5. Accessories Section
6. Left Fuel System Motive Flow Line
7. Mechanical Rudder Linkage
8 Right Engine
9 Aft Keel Right Longeron
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aircraft. As will be seen, the P(k/h) values used in the
analysis are less than the uninstalled values presented in
the previous chapter (Table 7.5). This is because the
lethality of each fragment is based on its striking velo-
city on the component. Due to shielding and overlap, the
degree of lethality is inversely proportional to the dis-
tance the fragment travels through the aircraft. In other
words, as the fragment slows down, the resultant P(k/h)
value for a hit component is less than its uninstalled
value.
1. Definitions
The following definitions parallel Ball's [Ref.
2:pp. 158-159] explanation of the variables used in a
vulnerability assessment. In this assessment, everything
is related to the cell presented area, whereas Ball
presents the methodology based on component presented area.
The explanations given below refine Ball's notation.
ci: This subscript represents the "ith" component
on the "cth" shotline. In this case study,
"c" will have the value of 1, 2 or 3, depend-
ing on the particular cell or shotline being
analyzed. Shotline/cell 1 (li) is the for-
ward shotline (entry thru the cockpit— see
Figure 8.3). Shotline/cell 2 (2i) is the
the middle shotline (entry thru the left in-
let duct) . Shotline/cell 3 (3i) is the aft
shotline (entry thru the left engine)
.
A<v .>: The vulnerable area of the "ith" component on
ci the "cth" shotline. The number that "i" re-
presents is the number assigned to the compo-
nent in Table 8.1. For example, from Table
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8.1, the mechanical stabilator hinge is in-
tersected by shotline 1. The vulnerable area





The presented area of each cell. As mention-
ed earlier, this value is a constant
at 1.0 square feet.
P<s/h
ci>: The probability of the "ith" component on the
"cth" shotline surviving, given a hit on this
component.
P<k/h .>: The probability of the "ith" component on the
"cth" shotline being killed given a hit on
this component. These values are also known
as the installed P<k/h> values.
P<S/H
c
>: The probability of the aircraft surviving
given a hit on the "cth" cell.
P<K/H >: The probability of the aircraft being killed
given a hit on the "cth" cell.
A<V >:
c
The vulnerable area of the "cth" cell.
A<P>: The presented area of the entire aircraft.
Using Figure 8.2 this was determined to be
399.0 square feet.
P<S/H>: The aircraft probability of survival given a
random hit on the aircraft.
P<K/H>: The aircraft probability of kill given a
random hit on the aircraft.
A<V>: The total single hit vulnerable area of the




The following mathematical relationships will be
used to determine the single hit vulnerability of the A-20.
Ball [Ref. 2], presents these relationships on pages 159-





cl >) (P<s/hc2 >) . . . (<Ps/hcn>) (8.1)
P<s/h
ci >





ci >) (A<pc>) (8.3)








A<V> - = A<V,> + A<V_> + . . . + A<V. T> (8.6)12 N
P<K/H> = A<V>/A<P> (8.7)
P<S/H> = 1 - P<K/H> (8.8)
3 Nonredundant Components with Overlap (shotline 1)
This first situation is specifically addressed by
Ball [Ref. 2:pp. 163-166]. The components intersected by
shotline 1 will be used to show the methodology for this
situation. The results of the analysis on this shotline
will be values for P<K/H > and A<V >.
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The list of components that are intersected by
shotline 1 are given in Table 8.1 and are also listed in
Table 8.2. The uninstalled P<k/h> values for each of these
components (P<k/h >) , is given in Table 7.5 and is also
given in Table 8.2. The P<k/h> value for the installed
components (P<k/h >) has been estimated and is presented
in Table 8.2. The component vulnerable are in each cell
(A<v .>) is equal to the P<k/h .> value because of the fact
that each cell's presented area (A<p > is equal to one
square foot. This will be true for all three situations.
TABLE 8.2 SHOTLINE 1
NONREDUNDANT COMPONENTS WITH OVERLAP
Component P<k/h > P<k/h . > & A<v .
>






transfer tank 0.65 0.3
4 forward keel right
longeron 0.15 0.10
1A<v . > is in square feet
ci ^
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For this situation, the mathematics will be pre-
sented in detail, showing equations, value substitutions,
and methodology. The other two situations will be pre-
sented by citing appropriate equations and values. The
only portions that will be examined in detail in the other
two situations are those that make each one unique.
To determine the vulnerability measures of the air-
craft given a hit on cell 1, the following methodology is
followed:
Using Eqns. (8.1) and (8.2) and the data given in Table
8.2, the value for P<S/H
1
> is determined from
P<S/H
1
> = (1 - P<k/h11 >) (1 - P<k/h12 >) (1 - P<k/h13 >)
(1 - P<k/h14 >).
Substituting the values for P<k/h
1
. > from Table 8.2 into
the expression for P<S/H_> gives
P<S/H
1
> = (1_- 0.9) (1 - 0.2) (1 - 0.3) (1 - 0.1)
= 0.050.
Using Eqn. (8.4) to determine the probability of killing
the aircraft given a hit on cell 1 gives
P<K/H
X
> = 1 - P<S/H
1
>
= 1 - 0.050
= 0.950.
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Equation (8.5) is used to determine the vulnerable area
of cell 1. This value will be used later to determine
the A<V> of the aircraft and the P<K/H> of the aircraft




1 >) (A<P 1 >)
= (0.950) (1.0 ft. 2 )
= 0.950 ft. 2
The only difference between the A-2 assessment
given here and Ball's approach is that Ball [Ref. 2] uses
the total presented area of the component to determine the
component vulnerable area. However, this procedure (which
is equivalent to the computerized procedure) treats each
cell as a unique "component". Eventually, the total vulner-
able area of each component is computed as the sum of the
component vulnerable areas on each cell.
This first situation resulted in a high value for
the P<K/H
1
>. This value reflects the lack of component
redun- dancy in this part of the aircraft. The next
situation, redundant components with no overlap, shows how
redundancy can reduce the P<K/H > value.
4 . Redundant Components with No Overlap fshotline 2)
This second situation is addressed by Ball [Ref.
2: pp. 166-168]. Table 8.3 presents the components
intersected by shotline 2 and their uninstalled P<k/h>
values.
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TABLE 8.3 SHOTLINE 2
REDUNDANT COMPONENTS WITH NO OVERLAP
Component P<k/h > P<k/h . > & A<v .
>
_' HD- ._.._2i_ _2i_
1. left inlet duct 0.5 0.4





and left engine kill 0.25
3. hydraulic feed line cir-
cuit no. 1 (Redundant) 0.5 0.3
4. mechanical aileron link-
age mechanism 0.3 0.1
5. outboard starboard mis-
sile motor 0.8 0.5
6. right longitudinal trans-
fer tank 0.65 0.20]
7. center keel right lon-
geron (Redundant) 0.15 0.05
1A<v . > is in square feet,
ci ^
These components will be used to assess the effect
of redundancy in components and also to show the effect
of cascading damage [Ref.2: pp. 165-166]. Component re-
dundancy has a significant effect on the values of
P<S/H > and A<V >. A single hit on the cell will not kill
enough of the redundant components to cause a kill of the
aircraft. (The theory and logic behind this statement is
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shown by Ball on pages 167-168, Eqns. (5.22a-d). This
results in the redundant components not being a factor
in the calculations for the aircraft's vulnerability
measures.
Cascading damage also has a significant effect on
the aircraft's vulnerability. This is a type of damage to
a component not actually hit by the damage mechanism but
that is damaged due to the response of the hit component.
This damage may or may not be severe enough to cause a
loss of the aircraft. This cascading effect will be ill-
ustrated by examining the consequences of the hit on the
forward feed tank, component 3.
The cascading effect of forward feed tank's damage
essentially "creates" another critical component. In this
situation, the fuel tank can be killed by a fire/explosion
with a P<k/h> of 0.15 as shown in Table 8.3. The cascade
effect occurs when the fuel tank is hit and hydraulic ram
causes it to weaken structurally to the point where fuel
leaks from the tank into the left inlet duct and is ingest-
ed by the engine. This in turn causes a kill of the engine
and hence the aircraft. The probability that this occurs
is found to be 0.25 (Table 8.3).
Since the engine is not located along this shot-
line, P<k/h .> and A<v .> values for the "created" com-
'
' ci ci
ponent must be determined for this situation using the
P<k/h> data and Ball's methodology on pages 163-165. The
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aircraft can survive the hit in the fuel tank if there is
neither a fire kill or a fuel ingestion kill of the engine.
The probability that neither of these will occur is found
by utilizing Eqn. (8.2). The product of the probability
that there is no fire, (1 - 0.15), and the probability that
there is no fuel ingestion kill of the engine, (1 - 0.25),
is 0.64. Therefore, the probability of kill of this
"created" component considering the cascading effect is
(1 - 0.64) = 0.36. Thus, by accounting for the cascading
effect of the fuel tank damage a critical component is
"created" for this situation whose probability of kill is
greater than either of the components that contributed to
its creation.
The analysis of this situation will be presented in
two parts. The first part will show the effects of the
cascading damage on the P<K/H >, and A<V"2 > values. The
second part will show how the values change without the
cascading damage being a factor.
The values for P<S/H >, P<K/H > and A<V > for the
redundant and cascading situation are calculated using the
same methodology and equations (8.1 thru 8.5) as in the
first situation. For the cascading damage problem, only
six components (1, 2, 2a, 4, 5 and 6) are used to determine
the vulnerability values. As shown in Table 8.3, compo-
nents 3 and 7 are redundant and do not contribute to the
aircraft's single hit vulnerability (Note, however, that
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every component, redundant or not, has a vulnerable area as
given in Table 8.3).
The computed values for redundancy and cascading damage
without overlap are as follows:
P<S/H
2
> = (1 - 0.4) (1 - 0.15) (1 - 0.25) (1 - 0.1) (1 - 0.5)
(1 - 0.2) see (8.1)
= 0.138.
(The product of the second and third terms in
the above equation equals 0.64. From Eqn.
(8.1), (1 - 0.64) equals 0.36, the value of








> = 0.979 ft. 2 see (8.5)
For comparative purposes, the following values were com-




> = 0.092. see (8.1)
P<K/H
2
> = 0.908. see (8.4)
A<V
2
> = 0.908 ft. 2 see (8.5)
From this simple comparative example shown, it can
be seen that component redundancy does decrease the prob-
ability of aircraft kill given a hit in cell 2.
If cascading damage was not considered in this sit-
uation, then the engine kill is not considered and the
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third term ((1-0.25)) in the expression for P<S/H > be-
comes unity. Calculations of the vulnerability values for
both the redundant and nonredundant situations (for
comparative purposes) follow.
The non-cascading redundant component calculations use




> = 0.184. see (8.1)
P<K/H
2
> = 0.816. see (8.4).
A<V
2
> = 0.816 ft. 2 see (8.5)
The non-cascading nonredundant component calculations








> = 0.878. see (8.4)
A<V
2
> = 0.878 ft. 2 see (8.5)
These analyses show the importance of properly con-
sidering cascading damage and component redundancy. By
eliminating the cascading damage problem, the survivability
of the aircraft if hit in this cell increases significantly
(P<S/H > of 0.184 vice 0.122). This is a design considera-
tion that will be discussed later in this chapter.
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5 . Redundant Components with Overlap (shotline 3)
The final situation discussed is where redundant,
overlapping components occur along the same shotline (shot-
line 3). Table 8.4 provides the components as intersected
by shotline 3. Ball [Ref. 2], addresses this situation on
pages 168-169 of his text. Specifically, Eqns. (5.22a) and
(5.22b) [Ref. 2:p. 167] show how redundancy and overlap are
handled. In this situation, a single hit in the overlap
region has the probability of killing both engines.-
The calculations that follow exhibit the method-
ology required for this situation. Comparative values are
also computed to show the probabilities if there was no
overlap in the region.
The methodology for calculating the vulnerability
values is very similar to that displayed in the first two
situations. The difference is noticed when accounting for
the redundant, overlapping engines. This is handled by
applying Ball's Eqn. (5.22b) [Ref. 2:p. 167] to the en-
gines and the author's Eqns. (8.1) and (8.2) as follows:
P<S/H
3
> = (1 - (P<k/h33 >) (P<k/h 38 >)) (1 - P<k/h34 >)
(1 - P<k/h35 >) (1 - P<k/h36 >) (1 - P<k/h37 >)
(1 - P<k/h 32 >)
.
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TABLE 8.4 SHOTLINE 3
REDUNDANT COMPONENTS WITH OVERLAP
Component P<k/h > P<k/h . > & A<v . >
un ex ci
1. aft side left longer-
on (Redundant without
Overlap) 0.10 0.07
2. left rudder hydraulic ac-
tuator 0.35 0.3




4. left forward fuel vent line 0.4 0.35
5. accessories section 0.6 0.2
6. left fuel system motive
flow line 0.8 0.65
7. mechanical rudder linkage 0.3 0.2
8. right engine (Redundant
with Overlap) 0.3 0.15
9
.
aft keel right longer-
on (Redundant without
Overlap) 0.10 0.01
1A<v .> is in square feet
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Note that components 1 and 9 are not included in these
calculations because they are redundant (with other com-
ponents not on the shotline) and do not overlap. The
vulnerability values are as follows:
P<S/H
3
> = (1 - (0.25) (0.15) ) (1 - 0.35) (1 - 0.2) (1 - 0.65)








> = 0.902 ft. 2 see (8.5)
If the shotline did not not intersect the two redundant,
overlapping components, the method of calculation is the
same as in the second situation discussed, redundant com-




> = 0.101. see (8.1)
P<K/H
3
> = 0.898. see (8.4)
A<V > = 0.898 ft. 2 see (8.5)
With redundancy and no overlap, the aircraft's
chances of survival increase from 0.098 to 0.101. The
overlap area has a definite detrimental affect on the air-
craft survivability from this aspect being assessed.
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6. Overall Aircraft Survivability
Equations (8.6), (8.7) and (8.8) provide the math-
ematical relationships needed to determine the overall vul-
nerable area and probability of survival.
From the aspect presented in Figure 8.2, the value for N
in Eqn.(8.6) is 449 cells. For the sake of brevity, the
A<V> of the aircraft was estimated to be
A<V> = 0.950 ft. 2 + 0.979 ft. 2 + 0.902 ft. 2 + A<V . > +
4
... + A<V. T>N
2
= 300.0 ft. (estimate for methodology)
The P<K/H> is determined from Eqn. (8.7). The aircraft's
A<P> = 399.0 square feet.
P<K/H> = A<V>/A<P>
= 300.0 ft. 2/399.0 ft. 2
= 0.752.
The P<S/H> of the A-2 is calculated by using Eqn. (8.8):
P<S/H> = 1 - P<K/H>
= 1 - 0.752
= 0.248.
These values may not seem to be very realistic,
nor are they necessarily intended to be. As has been re-
peatedly stated throughout this case study, all values used
are based on the author's desire to present the assessment
in a clear, concise and unclassified manner. This case
study is meant to show the methodology involved in
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conducting a vulnerability assessment, not to determine
actual, viable vulnerability values.
B. VULNERABILITY REDUCTION FEATURES
The remainder of this chapter briefly discusses several
of the vulnerability reduction features that Ball presents
in his text [Ref. 2: pp. 199-221] and how they relate to the
A-20 and this assessment.
1. The Fuel System
The A-2 does have some vulnerability reduction
features inherent in it's design, such as foam in the wing
tanks, fuel feed line redundancy, motive flow, a "get home
fuel" compartment in the main feed tank and the majority of
the plumbing on the interior of the tanks. The A-20's
greatest fuel system design flaw is the location of the the
fuel tanks. Ball [Ref. 2], presents an analysis of this
problem on pages 203-204. The A-20's longitudinal transfer
tanks present too much exposed surface area; and as seen
from the single hit vulnerability assessment, the forward
feed tank is located in a position where engine fuel inges-





The A-20's propulsion system does have redundancy
in the engines and mounting system. The major flaw in it's
design is with it's location adjacent to a fuel tank (See
. 186
Ball [Ref. 2:pp. 214-215]). The inlet duct is situated
such that fuel ingestion with resultant engine fire is a
possibility. On the other hand, the inlet ducts are mount-




The Flight Control System
The A-20's flight control system is multiply redun-
dant. It is unusual in that it has a complete mechanical
backup to the AFCS . The component placement of the hydrau-
lic reservoirs which store the fluid to actuate the flight
control surfaces is a weakness of the A-20 design. The
main reservoirs are located beneath the engines with the
majority of surface area vulnerable to ground fire. Ball
[Ref. 2:pp. 199-200] writes about the positioning of crit-
ical components to where they are shielded and kept away
from any component that might contribute to cascading
damage, such as hydraulic fluid finding its way onto the
hot engine.
4 The Crew System
The A-20 carries no armor for the pilot (See Ball
[Ref. 2:pp. 220-221]). For the type mission it is designed
for, armor might be a viable tradeoff to reduce the pilot's
installed P<k/h>. The cockpit location in the vertical
plane is also a design feature that needs some work. The
height at which the pilot sits presents more exposed body
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surface area than desired. There is room to lower the
cockpit in the design configuration.
All of these vulnerability reduction features (and
others) , were considered when the author was performing a
second iteration on the A-20's design. The second itera-
tion of the A-20 is shown in Figure 8.10. Notice how the
intake has been moved aft, away from the forward fuel tank
and also the possibility of cannon exhaust ingestion. The
cockpit has been lowered, and, although not visible, there
are spall shields in the cockpit. Part of the fuselage,
just aft of the pilot has been more aerodynamically shaped
to provide for better airflow to the inlets (And a possible
reduction in the aircraft's radar cross section). This has
also resulted in a reduction of frontal area. Another fea-
ture worth investigating is the feasibility of 2-D nozzles
as shown in the figure.
188
Figure 8.10 A-20 Design Improvements
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS
The single hit vulnerability assessment and the steps
leading up to it are just the first ones that are necessary
to produce the complete methodology of a survivability
assessment. The following are recommendations for follow
on areas of concentration to complete this assessment:
1. Produce a methodology addressing the multiple hit
vulnerability of the A-20 [Ref. 2:pp. 169-180].
2. Determine the A-20's vulnerability to internally and
externally detonating warheads [Ref. 2:pp. 183-191].
3. Produce a case study assessing the A-20's suscepti-
bility (RCS, IR radiation, etc.) using Ball's
methodology [Ref. 2:pp. 227-311].
4. Tie in both the overall vulnerability and suscepti-
bility assessments to produce a scenario dependent
overall survivability assessment of the A-20 (See
Ball [Ref. 2:pp. 316-337]).
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